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THE EXCISE TAX AS A REGULATORY DEVICE
RAY A. BROWN
In the interesting study entitled "Facing the Tax Problem" published by the
Twentieth Century Fund the authors clearly show that taxation, apart from its
primary and ostensible purpose of securing revenue for governmental purposes,
inevitably effects a greater or less degree of governmental regulation of a social
or economic character.1 Taxes in themselves are economic charges which
must be paid in some way by the person affected. They must either come
from the surplus of the taxpayer, or the burden must be passed on to those
with whom the taxpayer has economic relations. Except in pure theory it
seems impossible to have a single uniform system of taxation affecting all
'alike. The state in seeking objects for taxation must act selectively, placing
the burden here, and exempting from it there. The necessary result is that
the property, persons, or activities taxed are handicapped in their competition
with others who do not carry that weight upon their shoulders. A tax placed
on tangible property, and not on intangibles, makes such tangible property less
desirable and decreases its economic value to the individual. An excise tax
on tobacco increases its cost to the consumer, with an inevitable effect on the
amount consumed. Particular objects of taxation meeting the popular disfavor
can be handicapped through the imposition of a tax; others who enjoy legis-
lative approval may be helped through exemptions from that burden.
Legislative bodies, national, state, and local have not been slow to recognize
this almost axiomatic truth. The statutes of l the states, providing systems
of general property taxation, contain liberal and extensive exemptions for
various types of property, and for varying classes of owners.2 In the ab-
sence of express restrictions in the state constitutions, but little restraint
exists on this power. It may be and often is used avowedly to favor certain
types of business activities, believed to be in need of such an economic
crutch.3 A much more satisfactory device for controlling economic enter-
"SHOUP AND AssocIATEs, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM, Ch. IX (1937). Chapters
X-XIV discuss this thesis in greater detail.
'For a discussion of the statutory provisions in the various states see, Baker, Tax
Exemption Statutes (1928) 7 TEXAS L. RIv. 50.
'Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 332 (1913); Union Bank & Trust Co. v.
Phelps, 283 U. S. 181 (1933) ; Wilson v. Monticello Cotton Mills Co., 180 Ark. 1090,
20 S. W. (2d) 859 (1930); Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 Pac. 203 (1930) ;
Mars Realty Corp. v. Sexton, 141 Misc. 622, 253 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1931) ; Duke Power
Co. v. Bell, 156 S. C. 299, 152 S. E. 865 (1930). There are, however, holdings that an
exemption granted to a single individual out of a general class, of which he is a part, is
invalid. Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N. H. 1, 146 Atl. 511 (1929); Lawrence
University v. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 136 N. W. 619 (1912). Cf. however,
Williams v. The Mayor, 289 U. S. 36 (1933). For a description of this type of statute
see Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes (1928) 7 TEX. LAw REv. 50, 60. As to the effect
of particular state constitutional prohibitions, see 2 COOLEY,, LAW OF TAXATION (4th ed.
1924) 1387.
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prise through the tax power is, however, the excise tax. This has a great
advantage over the exemption in that it adds to, rather than subtracts from,
the public revenue. By its very nature and definition it rests upon particular
goods, activities, and callings. An excise has been authoritatively defined as
"an inland impost operating as an indirect tax on the consumer, levied upon
certain specified articles, as tobaccos, ales, spirits, etc., grown or manufactured
in the country. It is also levied on licenses to pursue certain trades and deal
in certain commodities."4  Such a tax may also be employed by the federal
government, which possesses no power of direct general property taxation,
except on condition that it be apportioned among the several states according
to their population. It is with the constitutional limitations upon the use of
this type of tax for the ulterior purpose of social and economic control that
this article mainly deals.
Certain types of these limitations need not detain us long. They arise out of
the peculiar nature of our federal system, and are not particularly directed to
the use of the taxing power for regulatory purposes. The superiority of the
Constitution of the United States and of federal laws passed within the con-
stitutional grant of power have given rise to the doctrine that the states are in-
competent to levy a tax resting directly upon a federal instrumentality.5
Neither may a state burden directly a right granted to the individual by the
Constitution or by a valid law of Congress. 6 As a corollary to the immunity
of federal agencies from state tax burdens, a similar but less extensive limita-
tion has been held to rest upon the power of the Federal Government to tax the
instrumentalities of the state.7 The grant of power to the Federal Government
to regulate interstate commerce places important, and often puzzling, limita-
tions upon the state power to tax those engaged in interstate commerce. The
number and complexity of the cases on this subject are so great that the
'Brewer, J., in Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608 (1902). The italics are the present
author's.
'The leading case is, of course, M'Culloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (1819)
involving a state tax on the issue of federal bank notes. Other cases are: First
National Bank v. Hartford, 273 U. S. 548 (1927) ; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117
U. S. 151 (1886) ; Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292 (1914) ;
Pan Handle Oil Company v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) ; People ex rel Rogers
v. Groves, 57 Sup. Ct. 269 (1937).
'Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35 (1868) ; Lawrence v. Shaw, 57 Sup. Ct. 443(1937). In regard to patents and copyrights, the Supreme Court, reversing older de-
cisions now holds that the state may tax the owners thereof. Fox Film Corporation v.
Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932). In general see, Powell, Indirect Encroachirzent on Federal
Authority by Taxing Powers of the States (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321; Cohen and
Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of Federal Activities(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 807.
,Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 113 (1870). Cf. South Carolina v. United States,
199 U. S. 437 (1905) ; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911). See also Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co.,285 U. S. 393 (1932); Brush v. Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. 45 (1937). In
general see Cohen and Dayton, mpra note 6; Lewinson, Tax Exempt Salaries and Securi-
ties (1937) A. B. A. J. 685.
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matter cannot be gone into here.8 One thing is reasonably clear. The com-
merce clause prohibits the states from shaping their tax policies to favor
their internal commerce and industry at the expense of those moving goods
into the state from beyond its borders. 9 The Fourth Article of the Constitu-
tion granting to the citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of the
citizens of the several states also prevents the states from adopting a policy of
placing heavier burdens on nonresident than on resident tax payers.' 0
I
The above mentioned limitations upon the power to tax for regulatory mo-
tives must be mentioned in order to keep the record clear. Of more pertinent
effect are three other constitutional limitations. First is the limitation placed
on the federal government's exercise of power, made express by the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, that that government possesses only the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. Among the powers granted is the
power to tax. Absent is a general police power-the power directly to regu-
late the affairs of men for the purpose of advancing the general safety, health,
morals and welfare. The question then is directly raised; to what extent if
at all may the national government employ its taxing power for the ulterior
purposes of regulating matters not within its special competence?" It is
necessary to turn to the cases. Veazie Bank v. Fenno12 involved a federal
tax of ten per cent on the amount of state bank notes paid out by any bank.
The purpose of the law to drive such notes out of circulation by the levy of an
excessive tax upon them cannot be doubted.' 3 The Court, however, rather
curtly refused to consider this point. "The judicial cannot prescribe to the
legislative department of government limitations upon the exercise of its
acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon
persons but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the
'By all odds the most complete discussion of this matter is contained in a series of
articles by Professor Thomas Reed Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority
by the Taxing Power of the States (1918-1919) 31 HAuv. L. REV. 572, 721, 932, 32 Id.
234, 374, 634, 902.
'Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876) ; Darnell v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1908).
Cf. however, State Board v. Young's Market, 57 Sup. Ct. 77 (1936) concerning in-
toxicating liquor and resting on the 21st amendment.
"Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1920) ; Smith v. Loughman, 245
N. Y. 486, 157 N. E. 753 (1927). In a recent opinion, a divided Court held that the
seldom employed privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
prevented a state from favoring local loans as contrasted to loans made outside the state,
through the device of exempting from its income tax, loans made within the state at
not to exceed 5% per annum.. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
"For other discussions of this problem see Waite, May Congress Levy Money Exac-
tions designated Taxes solely for the Purpose of Destruction (1904) 6 MicH. L. REv.
277; Cushman, Social and Economic Control through Federal Taxation (1934) 18 MINN.
L. REv. 759; R. C. Brown, When is a Tax not a Tax (1936) 11 IND. L. J. 399.
"8 Wall. (U. S.) 533 (1869).
"See the opinion of the C6urt at p. 536-539; Cushman, supra note 11, at p. 766.
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people by whom its members are elected." The authority of the case to sus-
tain the general use of the taxing power for non-federal objectives is, how-
e¢er, considerably weakened by the fact that the law in question was sustained
not only by virtue of the tax power, but also by the power of Congress
over the currency. The same thing must be said of Hampton v. United
States,14 a unanimous decision sustaining a tariff law against the charge
that its purpose was not only revenue but protection of domestic industries.
The validation of the law in question on the ground of well settled practice,
could also have been placed on the exclusive control exercised by Congress
over foreign commerce.' 5 This weakness does not however exist in the cases
of In re Kollack'6 and McCray v. United States,'7 for there the ulterior pur-
pose of the tax law concerned a matter not within the direct domain of the
federal government. The first decision involved a federal excise tax of two
cents a pound on oleomargarine and other butter substitutes. The exaction
was unanimously sustained. "The act before us is on its face an act for levy-
ing taxes, and although it may operate in so doing to prevent deception in the
sale of oleomargarine as and for butter, its primary object must be assumed
to be the raising of revenue." Encouraged by this decision, Congress in-
creased the tax to ten cents a pound on the odious substitute when colored
to look like butter. The law was attacked not only as an infringement on the
police power reserved to the several states but also because the high rate of
the tax destroyed the appellant's business and so allegedly deprived him of
his property without due process of law. Again the Court sustained the law.
The Court may not overthrow a law, which on its face imposes a tax, by an
inquiry into possible ulterior motives of Congress. Neither may a tax be
declared beyond the scope of federal action because its burden may effect
a regulation of matter not within the realm of Congressional action. The
amount of the tax even though it might be so high as to work a destruction
of the thing taxed, is yet a matter within legislative and not judicial cogniz-
ance. Even if it be admitted for sake of argument that the taxing power could
not be used arbitrarily to discriminate between like activities or to destroy
innocent and legitimate business, the tendency of oleomargarine colored to
look like butter to work a fraud is sufficient reason to justify the harsh treat-
ment dealt it in the legislation at hand.' 8
Sonzinsky v. United States,'9 decided at the last term of the Supreme Court,
1276 U. S. 394 (1928).
'The Court, however, uses sweeping language: "So long as the motive of Congress
and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general
government the existence of other motives in the selection of subjects of taxes cannot
invalidate congressignal action."1165 U. S. 536 (1897).
17195 U. S. 27 (1904).
1rThe guestion of the power of either the national government or the state to
destroy innocent and legitimate business by excessive taxation will be dealt with infra.
'157 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
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sustained a federal tax of $200 on each sale of machine guns and sawed-off
shot guns against the charge that the enactment was a regulatory and not a
revenue measure. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
"Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.
But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect ... and
it has long been established that an act of Congress which on its face
purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because
the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed."20
This decision seems clearly to establish the competence of Congress to levy
excise taxes, even though the imposition may result in regulation or even
prohibition of matters outside the direct domain of federal power. Not only
may the regulation be achieved through the weight of the tax itself. Ancillary
regulations attached to a tax measure will be upheld as within the fiscal power
of Congress, in spite of the social or economic control they may achieve. It
is only necessary that the legislation accompanying the tax levy may be said
to have a reasonable relation to the process of levying and collecting the tax.2 '
The use of an ostensible taxing power to achieve control of matters not
within direct Congressional competence has not, however, been entirely un-
checked. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company,22 an all but unanimous
Court held unconstitutional a purported federal tax of ten per cent of the net
profits of certain described industries employing child labor. It is interesting to
note that the liberal justices Holmes and Brandeis concurred in the opinion.
It is believed that this case is not necessarily contradictory to those just
previously discussed. The Court rather "whips the devil around the stump"
in distinguishing its earlier declarations, by the simple expedient of declaring
that the exaction in this case is not a tax. The Court must still answer the
question why the imposition in the child labor case was not a tax as much as it
was in the oleomargarine and other cases. This it has attempted to do. The
second child labor statute provided that the proprietors of all mines, quarries,
canneries, work shops, and manufacturing plants who employed any children
under the age of fourteen, or children between fourteen and sixteen, beyond
To similar effect see, United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919) (federal tax
on narcotics) ; Alexander Theater Ticket Office v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44 (1927)
(tax on sales of theater tickets at "scalping" prices).21Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509 (1899) (tax on sales on boards of trade-regulation
required written memo of sale with names of parties, etc.) ; In re .Kollack, 165 U. S.
536 (1897) (tax on oleomargarine-regulation required sale of product in containers
clearly describing the product) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919) (tax
on narcotics-dealers in drugs required to register; sales, except by physician's sub-
scription in course of practice, to be on prescribed forms issued by Treasury Depart-
ment) ; Alston v. United States, 274 U. S. 289 (1927) (same). If the ancillary regu-
lations cannot be said to bear a reasonable relation to the revenue features of the act,
they are not, of course, within the power of Congress. Linder v. United States, 268
U. S. 5 (1925). See (1926) 3 Wis. L. REv. 357.
=259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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certain hours or at certain times should pay a federal tax of ten per cent on
their net profits. In the mind of the Court this was primarily a regulation
of child labor and the ten per cent exaction, not a tax, but a penalty upon those
who trangressed the regulation, all beyond the scope of the powers granted
Congress by the Constitution.
"Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do,
hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great num-
ber of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which the states have
never parted with, and which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amend-
ment, would be to enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of the
subject and enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To
give such magic to the word "tax" would be to break down all constitu-
tional limitation of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the
sovereignty of the states."
The conclusion of the Court was strengthened by the circumstances that the
so-called tax imposed had no relation to the profit derived from the thing taxed,
the same tax being levied whether one child was employed for a day, or five
hundred for a iear. It was only imposed when the employer knowingly em-
ployed children under the prescribed ages, and scienter was not customarily
a feature of revenue acts. On the same day the Court also held unconstitu-
tional a federal tax of twenty cents a bushel on all sales of grain of a future
delivery but exempted from the tax, sales on exchanges, which received a
license from the Secretary of Agriculture and complied "with the detailed
regulations prescribed by the law for the conduct of trading on the exchange.23
United States v. Constantine24 involved a federal law "taxing" those deal-
ing in intoxicating liquor contrary to the provisions of the state law, $1000
for the privilege' of carrying on such illegal business. This "tax" was in addi-
tion to the. regular federal excise of $25 on all liquor dealers. Again the
Court found an intent to regulate matters beyond the scope of federal power.
The ear-mark of its ulterior purpose seems to be the fact that the act branded
certain conduct as illegal, and then "taxed" the performance of such illegal
acts. This, in connection with the wide discrepancy between taxes on legal
and illegal liquor dealing, according to the majority, branded the exaction as an
ultra vires penalty rather than as a legal tax.2 5  Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 25 .
'Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922). See also Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475(1926).
=296 U. S. 287 (1935).
'Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, and Stone dissented. This decision had a precedent in
three unanimous opinions of the court all holding that imposition of disproportional
"taxes" upon those violating laws of Congress were penalties and not taxes. As such
they were subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon prosecutions of crimes
and were not collectible by the free and easy processes of the revenue acts. Helwig
v. United States, 188 U. S. 605 (1903) ; Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922);
United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568 (1931).
21298 U. S. 238 (1936).
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involved a 15% sales tax on bituminous coal, but exempted operators who
accepted codes of fair competition prescribed by the act. It was not seriously
contended that the act was sustainable under the taxing power. In these
decisions the previous cases such as Veazie Bank v. Fenno,26 and McCray
v. United States2 7 were distinguished on the ground that in those cases the
contention that the imposition was a penalty rather than a tax rested solely
on the amount of the tax. Here the "face of the act" disclosed its regulatory
character. Distinguished critics of the Court have found the distinction drawn
by it between the earlier and the later cases untenable.28 If the Court refuses
to holc an imposition, commonly accepted to be for prohibitive purposes,
ultra vires because of its excessive amount, why should it not likewise refuse
judicially to condemn a law, avowed to be for tax purposes, through the
process of examining the regulatory features in the context of the act? Both
criteria are used for the purpose of discovering the legislative intent. It is
believed, however, there is a distinction though it may be one of degree rather
than of kind. In the case of the amount of the tax, there is a natural judicial
reluctance to interfere with a matter so peculiarly of political rather than of
judicial cognizance. just how high must a tax be in order to be declared
prohibitive? A more patent consideration is probably.the realization by the
Court that in the Second Child Labor Case29 and in Hill v. Wallace30 a
device was projected which if sustained would easily lead to the extension of
federal power into all realms of human activity. It is the writer's belief that
the Court appreciates its quasi-political responsibility of keeping alive in our
governmental system the traditional separation of powers between the states
and the federal government. This traditional separation is the implicit major
premise in many of its decisions. The Court will not allow the line of demar-
cation to be obliterated through devices resting on possible logical deductions
from the bare verbiage of the Constitution, or by the circumstance that it is
often difficult satisfactorily to explain why this particular exercise of power
falls within the federal boundaries and the other exercise within the domain of
the states. After all, is there not cogency in the words of Chief Justice Taft
previously quoted from Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company?3 '
II
True, taxes, whether levied by the Federal Government or by the states,
-Supra note 12.
^'Supra note 17.
'Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1921-1922 (1922) 16 Am. POL. Sc. R Ev. 613; Cush-
man, Social and Economic Control through Taxation (1934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 757.
See, however, Powell, Child, Labor, Congress, and the Constitution (1922) 1 N. C. L.
REv. 61.
2Supra note 22.
S"Supra note 23.
=See sapra p. 50. Cf. CORwIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTs(1936).
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may then be employed for the purpose of social or economic regulation.3 2
What, if any, are the limitations upon this power? First to be considered is
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The concept of equality before the law is so close to an irreducible, albeit
exceedingly elastic, axiom, that it almost defies exposition. Concerning the
phrase, the Court has declared, "equality has not been and probably never
can be precisely defined. Generally, it has been said that it only requires the
same means and methods to be applied impartially to all the constituents of a
class so that the law shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in
similar circumstances." But the difficulty arises in determining what are
similar circumstances. The state has a wide discretion in making classifica-
tions, but it may not be arbitrary. There must be "some difference which
bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and is not a
mere arbitrary selection." Special legislation to meet special problems is
certainly not prohibited. 33 Attempting to be more explicit, Mr. Justice
Brandeis has said "the equality clause requires merely that the classification'
shall be reasonable. We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelli-
gent, just minded, and civilized man could rationally favor."34
It will be noticed that there is no equal protection of the law clause speci-
fically applicable to the Federal Government. Does it follow that the Federal
Government may within the scope of the powers granted be as arbitrary as it
chooses? May it levy income taxes at one rate against those adhering
to a particular political party and at another rate against all their opponents?
It is believed that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would be
applied to prevent arbitrary classification by federal law. It is true that the
Court has at times taken pains to announce that the federal taxing power is
not bound by the limitation of equal protection.35 In these cases, however, the
-The question just discussed as to federal taxes has no importance as to the states,
which possess both the power to tax and the general police power.
3Mr. Justice McKenna in Magoun v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 283 (1898). For a declara-
tion that a classification must bear a relation to the purpose of the law see McKenna, J.,
in Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97 (1903). To preserve the public health and safety
physicians can be required to take a prescribed course of collegiate education, while
those pursuing other occupations might not be. It does not follow that in a revenue
measure physicians could be taxed at a higher rate than other citizens. In Aero May-
flower Transit Corp. v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 285 (1935) it was held that farmers
carrying their own produce to market could be relieved from certain excise taxes on
automobile trucks. In Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 533 (1931) it was held that a
safety law was invalid which exempted such carriers from its provisions.
'Dissent in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth, 277 U. S. 389 (1928). Mr.
Justice Cardozo, conversely, has described the unconstitutional classification as one
that has "its origin in nothing better than whim and fantasy, a tyrannical exercise of
arbitrary power." Dissent in Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535
(1934).
31La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921). "The Fifth Amend-
ment has no equal protection clause; and the only rule of uniformity prescribed with
EXCISE TAX AS A REGULATORY DEVICE
tax would undoubtedly have been valid, even if the clause in question had been
applied to it. On the other band, in one of the most thorough discussions
of the taxing power, Chief Justice White conceded that an arbitrary classifi-
cation producing "a gross and patent inequality" would not be sustainable.3 6
Further tending to support the proposition just hazarded is the fact that the
Court has often considered attacks on federal laws based on claims of arbi-
trary and uneqtial treatment, when, if the principle of equality were inapplic-
able, a vastly easier disposal of the contention could and should have been
made.3 7  Lastly, in Heiner v. Donnan38 a divided Court held that a federal
estate tax levied on inter vivos gifts made within two years of death could
not be sustained as a tax on a certain class of inter vivos gifts. The Court
followed the previous case of Schlesinger v. Wisconsin,3 9 involving the val-
idity of a state statute to similar effect under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stated that since the classification in the earlier case was invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment the similar classification in the federal act
was invalid under the Fifth Amendment.40 "Due process of law" can per-
haps best be resolved into a prohibition upon. arbitrary and outrageous
actions by the government. It has been held to prevent taxation of previously
vested interests ;41 taxation by a state of subjects not within its jurisdiction ;42
respect to duties, imposts and excises laid by Congress is the territorial uniformity
required by Article I, Section 8." See also National Paper Co. v. Bowers, 266 U. S.
273 (1925).
'In speaking of due process of law limitations upon the federal taxing power, that
learned, though often abstruse, justice said: "And no change in the situation here
would arise even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that this doctrine would have
no application in a case where, although there was'a seeming exercise of the taxing
power, the act complained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that
it was not the exertion of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of
the same in violation of the 5th Amendment; or, what is equivalent thereto, was so
wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a gross or patent inequality as
to inevitably lead to the same conclusion." Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240
U. S. 1 (1916). See also White, Chief Justice, in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.
41 (1900).
WNicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509 (1899); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27(1904); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911); Billings v. United States,
232 U. S. 261 (1914) ; Alaska Fish Salting Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921) ; Pacific
American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269 (1925) ; Bromley v. McCaughn, 280
U. S. 124 (1929); Chas. E. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937).
In the last cited case, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in upholding certain exemptions from the
tax levied under the national Social Security Law took occasion to remark that the
Fifth Amendment had no equal protection clause. He added, however, that the
exemptions were valid "though we assume that discrimination, if gross enough, is
equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and
annulment." [For a full discussion of the Social Security Cases iee article by Prof.
L. B. Orfield, infra p. 85.-Ed.]
m285 U. S. 312 (1932).
*1270 U. S. 230 (1926).
"
0Mr. Justice Stone dissented, taking, in part, the ground that the Fifth Amendment
had no equal protection clause and that "no tax has been held invalid under the Fifth
Amendment because based on an improper classification."
"Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927).
"Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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and to be a bar to double taxation.43  The writer does not doubt but that
the Court would apply its limitation as contained in the Fifth Amendment
to prevent arbitrary and unreasonable classifications. 44
It is clear, however, that the concept of equal protection of the law does
not require the states or the Federal Government to adopt a tax system
of rigid and unvarying uniformity. The general operation of this clause
as applied to tax legislation was stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in Bell's
Gap Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth45 as follows:
"The provision in the fourteenth amendment, that no state shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, was not intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system
of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses,
exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as
churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institutions. It may
impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions,
and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax
real estate and personal property in a different manner; it may tax
visible property only, and not tax securities for payment of money; it
may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. All such
regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within
reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the
state legislature, or the people of the state in framing their constitution.
But clear and hostile discriminations, against particular persons and
classes, especially such as are of an unusual character, unknown to
the practice of our governments, might be obnoxious to the constitu-
tional prohibition."
With the general principles thus enunciated by the Court no quarrel can be
found. The difficulty comes, of course, in their application. After reading many
of the cases one is almost brought to believe that the validity or invalidity
of a given tax discrimination depends not so much upon the inherent charac-
teristics of the act in question as upon the diverse sympathies and prejudices
of the judges who review the legislation. Are they or are they not inclined
to be ingenious and astute in discovering a possible valid purpose in the
classification at hand. 46  The task of finding a rational basis for many of
"
3First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
"See also BuaRncK, LAW OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) p. 416; WILLIS, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1936) p. 572.
5134 U. S. 232 (1889).
"There have been five chain store tax laws considered by the Court. Three have
been upheld as constitutional; two have been declared unconstitutional. In all of these
five cases Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler have thought the law a denial
of equal protection. In all five cases, Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo have con-
sidered the law constitutional. The diverse results are due to the switch from one
side to the other of Justices Hughes, Van Devanter, and Roberts. State Board of Tax
Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931), law constitutional, Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler dissenting; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U. S. 517 (1933), law unconstitutional, Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo dissenting;
Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935), law constitutional, Justices McReynolds,
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the decisions is not made easier by the circumstance that often the Court
simply declares the classification contained therein reasonable, without giving
any basis for its conclusion in that respect.
Since this paper is devoted to a consideration of the taxing power for
the incidental purpose of regulation, we need not consider all attacks on
taxation based on the denial of equal protection. 47 Some general observa-
tions may, however, be made. As is seen a rigid uniformity is not required.
An excise tax by its very nature is levied on a special article, calling, or
transaction. In selecting matters for such taxation the legislature has a
wide discretion. Providing the object or transaction taxed has in popular
acceptance an actual separate identity of its own, the tax is not invalid
because the tax-payer thinks that other similar objects or transactions might
also be taxed. Thus an excise tax may be laid on sales of produce on ex-
changes or boards of trade without at the same time levying a tax on such
sales of stocks and bonds.48 Where, however, no such de facto, generally
accepted distinction exists between the subject taxed and that not taxed,
and the distinction drawn seems to the Court fanciful, it has overthrown
the tax in question. 49 That the distinction between the first group of cases
and the second is not always easy to draw is indicated by the fact that in
all the cases in the second group the so-called liberal judges dissented from
the majority view that the classification was arbitrary.50 The practical
Sutherland, Butler dissenting; Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935),
law unconstitutional, Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo dissenting; Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937), law constitutional, Justices Mc-
Reynolds, Sutherland, Butler dissenting. These cases will be discussed infra.
"rWhen the tax statute is entirely innocent and regular but the inequality is due to
its faulty administration, the problem raised is not involved here. See Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 200 U. S. 441 (1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board
of Revision, 284 U. S. 23 (1931).
'Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509 (1899). See also, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142
U. S. 339 (1891) (tax on express companies) ; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S.
194 (1897) (same) ; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261 '(1905) (tax on retailers
and not on wholesalers of cigarettes) ; Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226 (1906)
(tax on meat packing establishments); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914)
(classified public utility tax) ; Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184 (1916) (tax
on grain exchanges); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499 (1929) (tax on sale
and not on consumption of oil); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 179
(1933) (tax on production of electric power by water or steam, and not by internal
combustion engines).
"
0 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926) (inter vivos gifts made within
six years of death of donor); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932) (similar);
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1927) (mortgage tax on mort-
gages not maturing within five years); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 271
U. S. 389 (1928) (tax on gross receipts of taxi-cabs when operated by corporations) ;
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933) (higher tax on chain stores operating in
more than one county, than on those within a single county) ; Concordia Fire Insurance
Co. v. People, 292 U. S. 535 (1934) (tax on general insurance companies also doing a
casualty insurance business-none on companies doing a casualty business alone).
'It has been held that the burden of showing the classification is arbitrary rests
upon the contestant of the tax. Citizens Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921) ; Con-
cordia Fire Insurance Co. v. People, 292 U. S. 535 (1934).
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exigencies of assessing and collecting imposts to supply the public revenue
may also be a valid ground for tax classification. Public utilities, because
of the wide spread, but unified nature of this business, and the undesirability
of collecting taxes from them through levy and sale of the property assessed,
may be treated differently from other tax-payers.51 Where one type of tax-
payer is subject to a particular type of tax, the fact that similar tax-payers
are bearing other tax burdens which the first are not, will often save the
law in question from the charge of unfair discrimination. 52  Exemptions
from taxation are often sustained on the ground that the possible revenue
to be derived would not justify the trouble and expense of collection.5" It
has also been held that when the tax delinquency problem is particularly
serious as to a certain type of tax-payers and adequate methods can be
devised to collect the tax from them, statutes may provide special means to
collect such taxes, without, including all delinquents within their scope.54
It is sufficiently obvious that, where a certain type of activity places unusually
heavy burdens on the public revenues, higher taxes may be exacted to meet
the situation presented. 55 Lastly, the courts have accepted the common
viewpoint of tax economists, and have sustained progressive taxes on the
ground that the tax may be graduated according to ability to pay.58  The
graduated special taxes on chain stores have been sustained on the ground
that that method of doing business gave the tax-payer special advantages
over single store owners, and, therefore, the former should pay heavier taxes. 57
It must not be supposed that the principles just stated furnish a master
'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Indiana, 165 U. S. 304 (1896); Puget Sound
P. & L. Co. v. King County, 264 U. S. 22 (1924). See also Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897) ; Savannah T. & I. Ry. v. Savannah, 198 U. S. 392 (1905).
'Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68 (1913); Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132 (1918) ; General American Tank Car Co. v.
Day, 270 U. S. 367 (1925) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
'Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 (1913); Broad River Power' Co.
v. Query, 288 U. S. 179 (1933); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 868
(1937).
"Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 (1895) ; King v. Mullins,
171 U. S. 404 (1898); Florida, etc., R. R. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471 (1902); White
River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692 (1929), Justices Butler, Taft, Van
Devanter dissenting.
'Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66 (1930); Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S.
509 (1931), Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932). These are
all cases of special taxes on commercial vehicles using the public highways.
'Magoun v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 283 (1898) ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900);
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1 (1916) ; Bromley v. McCaughn, 280
U. S. 124 (1924).
'State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931) ; Fox v. Standard
Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935) ; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 57 Sup. Ct. 772
(1937). In Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269 (1925) an excise
tax on salmon packed, was progressively increased in accordance with the number of
cases packed. This was sustained on the ground that a large pack furnished propor-
tionally greater profits than a smaller pack. Other cases supporting classification
based on special advantages are: Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509 (1899) ; Citizens National
Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921).
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key for unlocking tax problems. The retail merchant operating a single
store undoubtedly believes that the chain organization has so many advan-
tages over him that it is fair that it should pay heavier taxes. It is hardly
to be expected that an owner of 225 chain stores doing an annual business
of $1,000,000 would look with equanimity on paying $5,433 in taxes, while
a department store competing with him, and doing an annual business
of $8,000,000 would pay but a three dollar tax.58 It is often a difficult ques-
tion to determine whether the basis provided for a tax does indeed rest
on ability to pay. The majority of the Court thought that a retail store tax
graduated according to gross receipts did not reflect any greater ability to
pay. The dissenting Justices argued that it did.5 9  Let it be granted that
the state may shape its tax policies to meet the practical exigencies of levy
and collection, still the extent of this power is uncertain. It is often difficult
to determine whether a gift made within a limited period of death is an
ordinary untaxable inter-vivos gift, or one made in contemplation of death
and so taxable under the inheritance tax statutes. To meet the situation
inheritance taxes were assessed in all gifts made within a fixed period of
death. The majority of the Court twice held that the public's problem did
not justify thus singling out a limited class of inter-vivos gifts and subjecting
them to a special tax.60 The actual economic facts on which a tax classifica-
tion rests are often difficult of ascertainment. Even when they are dis-
coverable the troublesome task still remains of determining whether the
exigencies of the public revenue are sufficiently severe to justify taxing
one person higher than another on substantially similar intrinsic things. 1
In the cases just discussed, the exemptions, burdens, and distinctions of
the tax laws were germane to the tax as a measure of revenue. What are
the restrictions placed by the equal protection clause when these discrimi-
nations are used as instruments for social or economic regulation Some
matters are reasonably clear. Unless the Supreme Court completely abandons
its independence and tradition, it may confidently be asserted that equal
protection of the law denies to the government the power to enforce dis-
criminatory and oppressive taxes for the purpose of racial, religious, or poli-
tical persecution.6 2 Again, it does not need argument to prove that an
'In State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, supra note 57, Mr. Justice Suther-
land, dissenting, thought that there was not sufficient reason to distinguish between
chain stores and large department stores doing a greater gross business.
'Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550 (1935). Cf. Metropolitan Theaters
v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61 (1913), sustaining a license tax on theaters graduated accord-
ing to admission charged.
'Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926) ; Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312
(1932). In the former case Mr. Justice McReynolds assumes the very point in issue
by declaring that an unconstitutional levy cannot be justified by the possibility that
tax evasion may otherwise result.
"See State ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206 (1935), hold-
ing unconstitutional a statute permitting delinquent taxes to be compromised.
"Fortunately the Court has never been presented with such a statute. It has, how-
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activity which the state has power to suppress absolutely because of its
inherent anti-social characteristics it may also discourage or restrain by heavy
taxation.6 3  Neither is citation of authority required to sustain preferential
tax treatment of activities carried on for philanthropic and not for selfish
motives. Such activities carry a burden which otherwise the public would
have to sustain.64 The lower tax rate imposed on bequests, inheritances,
and gifts to the wife, lineal descendant, or close relative of a decedent or
donor can also be easily justified. Such preferential treatment undoubtedly
rests on the common acceptance of the moral obligation and proper inclination
of the transferor to be mindful of his immediate family and relatives.6 5
Manifestly, the legal status and relation of the corporation are so unique
as to justify special tax treatment. Incorporation is a privilege which a
state may either grant or deny. It follows that when the privilege is granted
it may be made subject to such taxes, levied specifically on that privilege,
as the state may wish to impose. The corporation so taxed is in no position
to claim that it is denied its constitutional rights. 66 Moreover, there is no
doubt but that the franchise to be a corporation is a valuable one, conferring
special privileges not possessed by natural persons. Corporations cannot,
therefore, object when these special privileges are subject to taxation, even
though no corresponding taxes are laid o~n natural persons conducting a like
form of business.67 Do these considerations justify the state in singling
ever, declared the principle in dictum. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 233 U. S. 59 (1912).
A special tax on hand laundries operated by men was alleged to be aimed at Chinese.
Mr. Justice Holmes said, if true, that "would be a discrimination which the Consti-
tution does not allow." See also Mr. Justice Bradley in Bells Gap R. R. Co. v. Com-
monwealth, supra note 45; Mr. Justice Brown in American Sugar Refining Co. v.
Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900).
'McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904); Hammond Packing Co. v. Mon-
tana, 233 U. S. 331 (1914); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934). These
were all taxes on oleomargarine. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1887),
upholding state statute forbidding sale of oleomargarine. In Rast v. Van Deman &
Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 (1915), a special excise on use of trading stamps was
sustained by direct resort to the powers of state to prohibit their use. In Alaska
Fish Salting Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921), sustaining an excise tax on use of
fish for fertilizer, the tax could be sustained on basis of states control over ferae naturae.
'In Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906), the Court sustained an
exemption in its inheritance tax laws of gifts to charities operating in Illinois and
not to those operating in other states.
'Magoun v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 283 (1898) ; Billings v. Montana, 188 U. S. 97 (1903);
Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87 (1906); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124
(1929).
'Kansas City, etc., Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227 (1916); Kansas City, etc., R. R. v.
Stiles, 242 U. S. 111 (1916). In the first of these cases the attack on the tax was
based on the commerce clause, but failed because of the principle above enunciated.
'Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911) involved a federal excise tax on
corporate franchises measured by the net income of the corporation. In sustaining
the power of Congress thus to discriminate between corporations and natural persons
the Court said: "It could not be said, even if the principles of the 14th Amendment
were applicable to the present case, that there is no substantial difference between the
carrying on of business by the corporations taxed, and the same business when conducted
by a private firm or individual. The thing taxed is not the mere dealing in mer-
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out corporations for discriminatory treatment when the tax is not upon
the corporate franchise as such, but is general in its inherent character,
resting on property or privileges possessed both by corporations and natural
persons? The answer of the Court is not clear. In Fort Smith Lumber Co.
v. Arkansas,6 8 a five to four decision sustained the right of a state to tax
corporate stock held by corporate owners, without placing a similar tax on
corporate stock owned by natural persons. Mr. Justice Holmes said in support
of the decision:
"If the state of Arkansas wished to discourage but not to forbid the
holding of stock in one corporation by another and sought to attain the
result by this tax, or if it simply saw fit to make corporations pay for
the privilege, there would be nothing in the Constitution to hinder. A
discrimination between corporations and individuals with regard to
a tax like this cannot be pronounced arbitrary, although we may not
know the precise ground of policy that led the State to insert the
distinction in the law."69
In Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,70 however, a six to three decision
held unconstitutional a state tax on the gross receipts of corporations engaged
in the taxi-cab business, while no such tax was levied upon partnerships or
individuals engaged in a like business. Corporations are, of course, persons,
within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. 71 The majority of the Court could see no valid reason to dis-
tinguish between the operation of taxicabs by corporations, and by natural
persons, and so held the law arbitrary in its classification and a denial of
equal protection. The dissenting Justices took, in part, a logical approach
to the problem. Since the state may levy special taxes on the unusual privi-
chandise, in which the actual transactions may be the same, whether conducted by
individuals or corporations, but the tax is laid upon the privileges which exist in con-
ducting business with the advantages which inhere in the corporate capacity of those
taxed, and which are not enjoyed by private firms or individuals. These advantages
are obvious, and have led to the formation of such companies in nearly all branches of
trade. The continuity of the business without interruption by death or dissolution,
the transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, the advantages
of business controlled and managed by corporate directors, the general absence of
individual liability, these and other things inhere in the advantages of business thus
conducted, which do not exist when the same business is conducted by private indi-
viduals or partnerships. It is this distinctive privilege which is the subject of taxation,
not the mere buying or selling or handling of goods, which may be the same, whether
done by corporations or individuals." See also Home Insurance Co. v. New York,
134 U. S. 594 (1890).
61251 U. S. 532 (1920).
'This case and the following case of White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U.
S. 692 (1929) also sustained statutes providing for the recovery of unpaid, or under-
assessed, taxes from corporations, and not providing like actions against natural persons.
The decisions were, however, based upon the ground that special necessity for recovery
of such taxes might exist in the former and not in the latter case. See supra note 54.
7'271 U. S. 389 (1928).
n'County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 13 Fed. 722, 743 (1882); Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933).
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lege enjoyed by corporations, 72 it may also achieve the desired result through
the medium of any of the generally recognized forms of taxation. As the
state may undoubtedly levy special excise taxes on the operation of vehicles
of public conveyance, and also special taxes on the corporate privilege, it
may combine these two types of taxes and levy special taxes on the operation
of such vehicles by corporations. Of greater significance in explaining
the diverse views of the majority and dissenting Justices are the remarks
made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion. A considerable
body of public opinion regards the corporate device as insidious, leading to
unfortunate concentration of wealth and power in a few individuals.73 The
learned Justice does not regard it as arbitrary for a state to direct its tax
policy so as to hamper this tendency.7 4  If the particular judge views the
corporate method of doing business as merely the normal and well accepted
way of doing business, he will doubtless regard with some abhorrence dis-
crimination between corporations and natural persons engaged in the like
type of business. A sympathetic attitude towards the view that corpora-
tions are undesirable instruments causing undue concentration of wealth,
will lead to an opposite conclusion.
Two opinions, both rendered by divided Courts, have held that discrimi-
nation between corporations within the state, doing similar types of business,
were arbitrary and unconstitutional. F.S. Royster Company v. Virginia75
held that to tax domestic corporations doing business in and out of the
state, on their entire income wherever earned, but to exempt entirely from
taxation such corporations who did no business whatever within the state was
a denial of equal protection of law. While the majority conceded that it
was entirely proper to exempt from taxation income and property out of
the state, there was no justification in giving such an exemption to domestic
corporations who did no business in the state and in refusing it to those
who did. The dissenting Justices would sustain the discrimination as a
justifiable incentive to non-residents doing business out of the state to in-
corporate in Virginia. Concordia Fire Insurance Company v. People76 held
a denial of equal protection to exist when a state taxed" fire insurance com-
panies, doing a casualty insurance business as a side line, on all their receipts
including those from casualty insurance, and placed no tax on the receipts of
companies doing a casualty insurance business alone. The dissenting Justices
considered that there was a sufficient difference between the two types of
corporations to justify different tax treatment. The only conclusions to be
'See supra note 67.
"See BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
"'In this connection see particularly the exhaustive discussion by Mr. Justice Brandeis
in his dissent to Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, supra note 71.
75253 U. S. 412 (1920).
"292 U. S. 535 (1934).
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drawn seem to be first, that the mere fact that a tax-payer is a corporation
does not expose it to arbitrary classification, and secondly, that the more
liberal judges can find a just basis for classification whereas the more con-
servative ones cannot.
Foreign corporations not admitted to do, and not doing, business in a
state are not "persons within the jurisdiction" within the meaning of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a condition of
their right to enter, a state may, therefore, impose higher taxes upon them
than on domestic corporations doing a like business. 77 After a severe struggle,
however, in which Mr. Justice Holmes argued valiantly that the absolute
power possessed by a state to grant or refuse foreign corporations the privi-
lege to do intra-state business necessarily comprehended the right to impose
any conditions it chose upon that privilege, it was finally established that
a foreign corporation, once within a state and owning property and doing
business therein, could not be subjected to greater tax burdens than domestic
corporations doing the same type of business. 78 Neither may the state make
it a condition on a foreign corporation entering a state that it submit to
unconstitutional enactments. 79 A discrimination between corporate tax-payers
solely on the basis of their domestic or foreign incorporation is not, therefore,
permitted. 0 It does not follow, however, that they must be taxed in all
respects alike. All that is requir&d is that there be no outrageous or arbi-
trary discriminations in the burdens placed upon them, and the protesting
tax-payer has the burden of showing such discriminations to exist.
81
In the above cases, legally founded or commonly accepted non-technical
norms justify the distinctions drawn. The Court has, however, broadly
declared that "a state does not deny the equal protection of the laws merely
by adjusting its revenue laws and taxing system in such a way as to favor
certain industries or forms of industry."8 12  At times the Court does not
attempt discovery of the possible reasons for the favoritism shown. Thus,
it is held that a state may levy an excise tax on hand laundries and leave
so-called "steam laundries" exempt.8 3 So a tax may be laid on meat-packing
7Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 (1888); Fire Association v.
Philadelphia, 119 U. S. 110 (1886).
'Southern Railway v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910); Bethlehem Motors v. Flynt,
256 U. S. 421 (1921). See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S.
1 (1910). In all these cases there were dissents expressed or registered.
'Terrel v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922), over-ruling Security Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246 (1906) ; Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U. S. 235 (1929).
sSee supra note 78.
'General American Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U. S. 367 (1926); Concordia Fire
Insurance Co. v. People, 292 U. S. 535 (1934). See also Baltic Mining Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 231 U. S. 68 (1913) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin,
247 U. S. 132 (1918). See supra note 52.
'Mr. justice Holmes in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
"Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, supra note 82.
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establishments and not on those packing other food products. 8 4 It seems
fairly clear that a state may encourage an industry which it believes to be
important and of great benefit to the state by exempting it from taxes laid
on related types of business. The fact that bituminous coal was the source
of important by-products, offering opportunities for increasing the manu-
factures of the state, seems to be the reason why an excise tax might be
laid on the mining of anthracite coal, and not on the mining of bituminous.8 5
The state may also validly favor the development of co-operative enterprises,
by exempting them from the taxes levied on identical businesses conducted
for the profit of the entrepreneurs.88 Exemptions to that constant favorite
of the legislature, the American farmer, have uniformly met with approval.
To hold otherwise would indeed fly in the face of the nationally declared
and accepted policy to foster and protect a basic industry widely believed
to be in need of all the support it is humanly possible to give it.8 7 The levy
of an excise tax on hand laundries conducted by men, and not by women,
was sustained on the ground that discriminations in regard to sex were proper
and that the state "might put a lighter burden upon women than upon men
with regard to an employment that our people commonly regard as more
appropriate for the former."88  It may be narrow and selfish, but it is quite
understandable that a state should desire to favor local activities conducted
by its residents. Tax laws directed to tlis purpose, where the commerce
clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourth Article of
the Federal Constitution do not apply,89 have been held based on reasonable
and not on arbitrary classifications.
'Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226 (1906).
'Heisler v. Thomas Colliery, 260 U. S. 245 (1922). In Aero Mayflower Corporation
v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 295 U. S. 285 (1935), an excise tax levied on
carriers for hire on the public highways exempted carriers in localities not served by
railroad. This was held proper. It is also held that carriers by water may be favored
by exemption from taxes placed on other types of carriers. Carmichael v. Southern
Coal Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937).
'Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322 (1913). See also Louisville Gas
and Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32 (1928) ; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Phelps,
288 U. S. 181 (1933), sustaining exemptions of building and loan associations.
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900) ; Continental Baking
Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932) ; Aero Mayflower Transit Corporation v.
Georgia Public Service Comm., 295 U. S. 285 (1935) ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co.,
57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937); Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883
(1937). The power to exempt in tax laws is wider than the power of exemption in
regulatory laws. Cf. with above cases: Connoly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S.
540 (1902) ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 (1931). See also Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S.
446 (1906).
'Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
'See supra notes 9-10.9 Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270 (1900), excise tax on occupation of securing
laborers, applicable only when such laborers were hired to work outside the state;
Cox v. Texas, 202 U. S. 446 (1906), tax on sales of wines, not applicable to sales
of wines produced from grapes grown in state, Nyhile same were in hands of producer
or manufacturer. In this case counsel failed to raise the question of the commerce
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Since every tax exemption places an added burden on the classes not
exempt, no sharp line can be drawn between those tax laws which are de-
signed to favor certain classes of taxpayers and those which are intended as
restrictions upon certain other taxpayers. A tax of wide-spread general
application with special narrow exemptions is usually intended to favor
those exempted. A special tax of narrow application only, on the other hand,
is usually designed as a restriction on the special class taxed. Here again,
the Supreme Court has placed no precise limitations on the legislative power
to act for the latter purpose. Although in many cases the restrictions im-
posed by the revenue law may be sustained on the ground that the state
by its police power might regulate or prohibit the thing taxed,91 the Court
often does not rely on this point, but sustains the statute in question on the
general power of the state to employ tax laws for restrictive purposes. 2
The special taxes on chain stores are undoubtedly partly promulgated at
the behest of the independent merchant as devices to hamper and discourage
the former method of doing business. The Court has, however, usually
ignored this phase of the problem, and has preferred to rely on the thesis
that the chain storegs particular organization and method of doing business
has given it a greater ability to pay, so that the laws in question are merely
designed to bring about a more equal distribution of the tax burden.9 3 The
so-called liberal members of the Court have, however, recognized the former,
more important aspect of the chain store tax and as such have supported it.
In Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,94 Mr. Justice Roberts,
writing the opinion of the majority, joins this group:
"Our decision need not, however, rest on conceptions of subject,
measure and rate of tax. Much broader considerations touching the
state's internal policy of police sustain the exaction. In the exercise of
its police power the state may forbid, as inimical to the public welfare,
the prosecution of a particular type of business, or regulate a business
in such manner as to abate evils deemed to arise from its pursuit.
Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may permit upon condition
clause. Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553 (1906), exemption from tax of
charities operating-in state only. See also State Board of Equalization v. Young's
Market, 299 U. S. 59 (1936). In Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914), it
was held proper for the United States to impose an excise tax on foreign built pleasure
yachts, and not on those domestically built. But cf. Bethlehem Motors v. Flynt, 256
U. S. 42 (1921).
'lSee supra note 63.
'See Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Alaska Fish
Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
In Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, supra, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "If Alaska deems it for
its welfare to discourage the destruction of herring for manure and to preserve them
as food for man or for salmon, and to that end imposes a greater tax upon that part
of the plaintiff's industry than upon the similar use of other fish or of the offal of salmon,
it can hardly be said to be contravening a Constitution that has known protective
tariffs for a hundred years."
'See supra note 57.
"57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937).
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that a fee be paid in return for the privilege, and such a fee may be
exacted to discourage the prosecution of a business or to adjust competi-
tive or economic inequalities. Taxation may be made the implement of
the exercise of the state's police power; and proper and reasonable
discrimination between classes to promote fair competitive conditions
and to equalize economic advantages is therefore lawful.
"If, in the interest of the people of the state, the legislature deemed it
necessary either to mitigate evils of competition as between single stores
and chains or to neutralize disadvantages of small chains in their com-
petition with larger ones, or to discourage merchandising within the
state by chains grown so large as to become a menace to the general
welfare, it was at liberty to regulate the matter directly or to resort
to the type of taxation evidenced by the Act of 1934 as a means of
regulation." 95
Recent and inevitable future changes in the personnel of the Court will
probably enhance an attitude of tolerance towards legislation regulating
trade, business, and manufacture. If such, indeed, be the course of events,
tax laws may be used to achieve that purpose. Those meeting the legislative
favor may be helped by exemptions; those not meeting that favor may be
shackled by heavy tax burdens. The Court will be loath to interfere.
III
One further possible restriction on the use of power to tax for regulatory
purposes remains for discussion. May a legislative body, national or state,
for the purpose of suppressing or destroying a particular activity place
upon it confiscatory or prohibitive taxes? Are such exactions entitled to
consideration as revenue laws, or must they stand or fall as regulatory acts,
depending for their validity on the police power of the state? Does due
process of law prevent prohibitory taxes on property or activities, which
are not within the power of the government by direct means to suppress ?
"
3In his dissent to Lewis ,K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933) Mr. justice
Brandeis declares: "The purpose of the Florida statute is not, like ordinary taxation,
merely to raise revenue. Its main purpose is social and economic. The chain store
is treated as a thing menacing the public welfare. The aim of the statute, at the
lowest, is to preserve the competition of the independent stores with the chain stores; at
the highest its aim is to eliminate altogether the corporate chain stores from retail
distribution." He looks with sympathy on the view that "the chain store, by furthering
the concentration of wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is
thwarting American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that
it is converting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the resources,
the vigor, and the hope of the smaller cities and towns." The precise basis of his
dissent seems, however, to be the corporate character of the plaintiff's in the particular
case. In Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935), Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing
the opinion of the majority, echoes somewhat the same idea: "A motive to build up
through legislation the quality of men may be as creditable in the thought of some
as a motive to magnify the quantity of trade."
"For other discussions of this problem see, Waite, May Congress Levy Money Exac-
tions Designated Taxes Solely for the Purpose of Destruction? (1908) 6 MicH. L. Rv.
277; Levirf, Does the Power to Tax Involve the Right to Destroy a Lawful Business?
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The answers to these questions by the United States Supreme Court and by
the courts of the individual states seem to differ. The Supreme Court has
definitely declared that "a tax within the lawful power of state" may not
"judicially be stricken down under the due process clause simply because
its enforcement may or will result in restricting or even destroying particular
occupations or businesses." 97
This attitude seems partly due to the early declaration by Marshall in
M'Cdloch v. Maryland97a that "the power to tax involves the power to de-
stroy." That declaration has been echoed by the Court many times since.98 It
is true that the aphorism was used in the M'Culloch decision and in many other
cases to overthrow rather than sustain the tax in question. This circumstance
does not, however, serve to destroy the cogency of the general declaration.
The Court declares that once it be admitted that a given subject matter
may be lawfully taxed, no constitutional limit exists to the amount of the
tax, and the taxing authority can therefore destroy that subject. This is
the major premise for the holding that even a moderate or slight tax upon
a forbidden subject matter may not be levied.99 It would be strangely in-
consistent for the Court after declaring this principle for the purpose of over-
throwing a moderate tax on constitutionally exempt subjects, to declare it
inapplicable to an excessive tax levied on a non-exempt subject.0 ° The
Court has also been extremely reluctant to search a law which on its face
merely levies a tax to discover therein hidden objectives, not within the
domains of the legislative power. As has been seen it has refused to hold
federal tax laws unconstitutional, on the sole ground that the amount of
the tax levied accomplishes regulation or suppression of matters not within
(1933) 67 U. S. L. REv. 448, 512; Cushman, Social and Economic Control through Fed-
eral Taxation (1934) 18 MiNN. L. Rxv. 759; R. C. Brown, Whet is a Tax not a Tax?
(1936) 11 IND. L. J. 399.
'r, Justice Sutherland, speaking for a unanimous Court in A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
7"14 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (1809).
"Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 35 (1867); Austin v. The Aldermen, 7 Wall.(U. S.) 694 (1868); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 168 (1911)'; Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522 (1916); Evans v. Gore,
253 U. S. 245 (1920); Alaska Fish Salting Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921); A
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 97; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935).
"See statement of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Macallen v. Commonwealth, 279 U. S.
620, 628 (1929).
"It is true that the great name of Mr. Justice Holmes is coupled with a statement
as curt and precise as that of the Chief Justice previously quoted, "The power to tax
is not the power to destroy while this court sits," dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928). This aphorism was used, however, to support
a moderate non-discriminatory state tax on a federal instrumentality. Other decisions
in which Mr. Justice Holmes participated show that when the subject matter of the
tax was within the scope of the taxing body's sovereignty, he would not overthrow a
tax because of its possible destructive effect. See McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27(1904); Alaska Fish Salting Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921).
The dictum of Chief Justice White (see supra note 36) may leave a loophole for
holding that confiscatory taxation is forbidden.
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the domain of direct federal action.' 0' Likewise, when tax measures are
contested on the ground that the tax is so heavy as to work a destruction
of individual interests contrary to the demands of due process of law, the
Court has upheld the law in question by refusing to consider the amount
of the tax as evidence of an unlawful motive in the taxing authorities. The
writer believes, however, that it is futile to attempt to answer questions con-
cerning the power of government to destroy particular businesses or occu-
pations by excessive taxation simply by drawing logical deductions from
general expressions of principle by the Court, entirely disassociated from
the actual decisions made in the cases in which they were enunciated. The
context in which the general statement is uttered must never be ignored.
When we examine the actual cases in which the Court decided that tax levies
alleged to be destructive of the particular subject taxed were constitutional,
we find that in most, if not all instances, it was within the power of the
government, insofar as due process of law was concerned, to accomplish
the alleged result by ordinary police regulation for that expressly avowed
purpose.10 2  This was certainly true of Veazie Bank v. Fenno,10 3 where
the Federal Government' under its power to regulate the currency could
prevent competing media of exchange from driving officially declared money
out of circulation. The power to place a ten cent a pound tax on oleo-
margarine colored to look like butter was, so far as due process was con-
cerned, partially justified on the ground that the sale of such goods could
lawfully be prohibited. 10 4  It seems that prohibitive taxes on uncolored
oleomargarine may also be sustained by reliance on the police power,
10 5
as well as by regarding them as mere manifestations of the ordinary power
to tax.' 0
6
It is, certainly, also true that due process does not deny to government
the power to forbid the sale of such lethal weapons as machine guns and
sawed-off shotguns.10 7 Indeed, when the Court was presented with an ex-
cessive tax on trading stamps it admitted their confiscatory character, but
sustained the law on the express ground that the state had the right to
prohibit their use by direct legislation under the police power.,0 8  The pro-
"See supra p. 65.10'Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533 (1869); McCray v. United States,
195 U. S. 27 (1904) ; A Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934) ; Fox v. Standard
Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935) ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937).
l'Supra note 102.
0''McCray v. United States, supra note 102.
"Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1897).108A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 102. Cf. however, the per curiam decision
in Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933), where the state constitution was
applied to hold an oleomargarine tax unconstitutional.
1 See Sonzinsky v. United States, supra note 102.
'-°Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U. S. 342 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240
U. S. 369 (1916).
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hibitive tax placed on the use of certain fish for certain purposes can also
be sustained through the power possessed by the state to control the wild
game within its borders." 9 The'last word of the Supreme Court sustaining
chain store taxes alleged to be prohibitive seems to be that the state may
prohibit under the police power "chains grown so large as to become a
menace to the public welfare" ;11o and a fortiori it can accomplish the same
result by taxation. While the general statements made by the Court would
seem to justify prohibitive taxes even on entirely innocent businesses or occu-
pations, the actual decisions of the Court go no farther than sustaining such
taxes when the state also has the power to destroy the thing taxed by direct
legislation.
Unless one is completely swayed by the desirability of judicial non-inter-
ference with legislative acts, it is refreshing to turn from the deliberate
,obtuseness of some of the United States Supreme Court opinions to the
forthright expressions of the state courts. State and municipal governments
have at times employed their taxing powers as instruments for the crippling
or destruction of certain types of business or commercial activity. Peddlers,
other transient merchants, auctioneers, and loan agencies have frequently
suffered from legislation of this character, but the state courts have not
looked with favor at such stratagems."' State v. Osborne,"12 involved a
state statute imposing a two-hundred dollar a year license tax on transient
merchants in each county in which they did business. The prohibitive effect
of the tax was apparently assumed. In holding such a levy unconstitutional,
the Iowa court said:
1
'Alaska Fish Salting Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921).
'oGreat Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. 57 Sun. Ct. 772 (1937). auoted supra p. 63.
uChaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527 (1880) involved a municipal ordinance regulating and
taxing peddlers of fresh meat. Concerning this law the Michigan court said:
"We do not think this by-law can be sustained as a regulation of hawkers or peddlers,
as it is evident that it was not so intended by its framers. Indeed, it appears to be
open to the charge of the respondent that it was passed in the interest of the persons
in said village selling fresh meat in shops, and in restraint of trade.
"It is quite common in these latter days for certain classes of citizens-those engaged
in this or that business-to appeal to the government-national, state or municipal-to
aid them by legislation against another class of citizens engaged in the same business,
but in some other way. This class of legislation, when indulged in, seldom benefits
the general public, but nearly always aids the few for whose benefit it is enacted, not
only at the expense of the few against whom it is ostensibly directed, but also at the
expense and to the detriment of the many, for whose benefit all legislation should be,
in a republican form of government, framed and devised. This kind of legislation should
receive no encouragement at the hands of the courts, and be only upheld when it is
strictly within the legitimate power of Congress, or the state or municipal legislatures."
The writer does not concur with the view of the court that this ordinance was
necessarily unconstitutional. Candor, however, compels recognition of the fact that
much legislation is not passed to promote genuinely common interests, but the interest
of one class as it clashes with the interests of another. The existence of active lobbies
in our legislative halls proves this fact. See Brown, Police Power-Legislation for
Health and Safety (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 866, 879.
'171 Iowa 678, 154 N. W. 294 (1915).
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".. . The power of the state to tax and regulate different occupations
and lines of business is not to bg denied. It is also true that the courts
have sometimes said "the power to tax is power to destroy"; but, as is
usual with all general propositions, this concession may be overworked.
The power to tax cannot lawfully be carried to an extent to destroy rights
or privileges guaranteed by the Constitution. The first section of our
Bill -of Rights assures to every man protection in his natural right to
acquire, possess and enjoy property. This necessarily includes the
right to buy, sell and exchange; and, in so far as the traffic is of a
harmless and useful character, the state may not impose an occupation
tax which shall operate as a prohibition or as a burden of magnitude
sufficient to render the right valueless. For example, if the legislature
should impose an occupation tax of one thousand dollars per year upon
every market gardener or farmer or carpenter or grocer or telegraph
operator or washer-woman, no court would hesitate to say it was an un-
constitutional abuse of power'. The power and discretion of the legislature
are broad, but they are not illimitable; and while we will be slow to
invalidate a statute enacted in due form, we will not hesitate to do so
if the unconstitutionality of the act is patent." 3
There are many decisions and more dicta from the state courts to like effect.
In spite of the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to pierce
through ostensible tax laws to discover in them unjustifiable suppressions
of innocent businesses and occupations, the state courts have not hesitated
to perform the task. Where, of course, the matter oppressively taxed is
something that the state may under its police powers suppress, the levy of
a prohibitive tax is sustained."14  Where, however, the activity oppressively
taxed is of an innocent character, the overwhelming weight of authority
in the state courts is that such laws are void under the due process of law
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or under the similar provisions of the
state constitutions." 5 Many of these decisions involved city ordinances,
"fto similar effect see Fiscal Court v. F. & A. Cox Co., 132 Ky. 738, 744, 117 S. W.
296 (1909).
'
4Hale v. State. 217 Ala. 403, 116 So. 369 (1928) ; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Md. 62
(1866); Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. E. 857 (1893); Commonwealth v.
McCray, 250 Ky. 182, 61 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1933) ; State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168
Pac. 679 (1917) ; Stalick v. Gallup, 23 N. M. 405, 168 Pac. 707 (1917).
'Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 469, 86 So. 52 (1920) (dictum) ; State
v. Kartus, 230 Ala. 352, 162 So. 533 (1935) (dictum) ; In re Dees, 50 Cal. App. 11, 194
Pac. 717 (1920); State ex rel. Bonesteel v. Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104 (1922)
(dictum); Miami Transit Co. v. McLin, 101 Fla. 1233, 133 So. 99 (1931) (dictum);
Williams v. Mayor, 152 Ga. 696, 111 S. E. 47 (1921) ; Shellnut v. City Council, 163
Ga. 502, 136 S. E. 446 (1927); City of Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N. E.
837 (1896) (city ordinance enacted under its police power); People v. Wilson, 249
Ill. 195, 94 N. E. 141 (1911) ; State v. Osborne, supra note 112; Fiscal Court v. F. &
A. Cox Co., supra note 113; City of Louisville v. Pooley, 136 Ky. 286, 124 S. W. 315
(1910) ; Sallsbury v. Equitable ,Purchasing Co. 177 Ky. 348, 197 S. W. 813 (1917);
Commonwealth v. McCray, supra note 114 (dictum); Iowa City v. Glassman, 155
Iowa 671, 136 N. W. 899 (1912); In re Opinions of Justices, 173 Me. 573, 121 At.
902 (1923), (dictum) ; Peterson Baking Co. v. Freemont, 119 Neb. 212, 228 N. W, 256
(1929); Grantham v. Chickaska, 156 Okla. 56, 9 P. (2d). 747 (1932); Matthews
v. Jensen, 21 Utah (207) 61 Pac. 303 (1900). See, however, contra, Stull v. De Mattos,
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but this is immaterial where the declaration of invalidity was on grounds of
unconstitutionality applicable to municipal ordinances as well as to state
legislation. Even the holdings that city ordinances levying prohibitive taxes
are not proper exercises of the charter power to tax, but to be sustained, if
at all, under charter grants of the police power are germane to the problem
under consideration. 116 They show a willingness to consider the amount
of a levied tax. as evidence that a purported exercise of a revenue power
is not so in fact, but the exercise of a power of another nature which is for-
bidden to the enacting authority.'1 7
In the judicial consideration of levying prohibitive taxes on businesses or
occupations, which are 'not within the power of the state to suppress by
direct means, the writer prefers the holdings of the state courts to the evasive
doctrines enunciated by the nation's highest court. Both legislative and
judicial repute suffer when, with judicial support, a legislative body, for-
bidden by constitutional mandates to destroy a certain business or occupa-
tion by direct means, is permitted to accomplish the identical result by con-
fiscatory taxation. It is true that the Supreme Court in adopting the doctrines
that it has, is influenced undoubtedly by a laudable desire not to declare
legislative acts ultra vires when any reasonable means of escape is possible. 118
23 Wash. 71, 62 Pac. 451 (1900) in which the court upheld an alleged confiscatory
tax by refusing to consider the amount of the tax as evidence of the use of an unlawful
power.
nOMoffitt v. City, 55 Colo. 112, 133 Pac. 754 (1913) ; Morton v. Mayor, 111 Ga. 162,
36 S. E. 627 (1900) ; Huguley-McCulloch Auto Co. v. La Grange, 159 Ga. 352, 125 S. E.
799 (1924); Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa 671, 136 N. W. 899 (1912); Caldwell
v. Lincoln, 19 Neb. 569, 27 N. W. 646 (1886) ; Monroe v. Endelman, 150 Wis. 621, 138
N. W. 70 (1912).
"'It is often a difficult matter to determine whether a tax is indeed' prohibitive or
confiscatory. The rule seems to be that the contestant bf the tax has the burden of
proving it to be so. The court will not conclude from the mere size of the tax that
it is confiscatory. Minnesota v. Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N. W. 383 (1914) ; Erwin
v. Omaha, 118 Neb. 331, 224 N. W. 692 (1929); State v. Razook, 179 N. C. 708, 103
S. E. 67 (1920). All the circumstances of a case must be considered. In Ex Parte
Sikes, 102 Ala. 173, 15 So. 522 (1893), a $2000 per year liquor tax was held not
prohibitive. It was shown that dealers actually did a sufficienf business to pay the tax.
However, the mere fact that an individual tax payer does not make a sufficient net in-
come to enable him to pay the tax, does not brand it as necessarily prohibitive. The
state does not guarantee profits to individuals. In testing the confiscatory character of
a tax it is also necessary to take a period of time sufficiently long to give a fair test.
See Williams v. Talladega, 164 Ala. 633, 51 So. 330 (1909) ; Wocopep Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 213 Ala. 450, 459, 105 So. 214 (1925) ; Interstate Co. v. Richardson, 177 Ga.
9, 169 S. E. 373 (1933). These were all cases where the tax vas undoubtedly levied
for revenue purposes. Where, however, the tax was shown to approach 100% of
the profits earned by the average proprietor of the business taxed, City of Louis-
ville v. Pooley, 136 Ky. 286, 124 S. W. 315 (1910); and where it consumed one-
third of the earnings of the most successful of the concerns taxed, Salisbury v. Equitable
Purchasing Co., 177 Ky. 348, 197 S. W. 813 (1917), the tax was held prohibitive.
See also Williams v. Mayor, 152 Ga. 696, 111 S. E. 47 (1921), where the tax was
apparently part of a corrupt scheme to secure a monopoly of the local ice business by
driving out small competitors.
'Concerning the unfortunate effect on the quality of justice of the pressure on the
courts to sustain at all hazards legislation claimed to be contrary to constitutional pro-
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When, as in the extension of federal regulatory powers through prohibitory
taxes, 1 9 objectives generally admitted to be desirable are achieved, we may
be inclined to believe that the end justifies the means. But it is not necessary,
and it is improper, for the Court to assume the ostrich role in order to sus-
tain oppressive and arbitrary measures against the innocent and worthy.
The writer believes that the Supreme Court, in spite of its general declara-
tions, will not do it. As has been pointed out, the cases actually before the
Court concerned prohibitive taxes on subjects which were within the legis-
lative power by direct means to suppress. In Adams v. Tanner,'2 0 the
Supreme Court held that it was not within the police power of the state of
Washington to abolish private employment agencies. Can it be supposed
that if the Washington legislature had immediately levied a $50,000 annual
license tax on such agencies, the Court would have sustained it? Does any-
one believe that the present Court would sustain prohibitive taxes on private,
schools, which, it has been held, cannot be outlawed by direct means? 121
Would not the Court pierce the subterfuge and declare the law vicious and
underhanded? If the state desires as a matter of public policy to destroy a par-
ticular business or method of doing business, should it not rely on its police
power, and however it seeks to achieve its objective, be limited by the bounda-
ries of that power? Indeed, the most recent opinion by the Court, in which
an alleged prohibitive tax on chain stores was sustained, seems to rely
directly on the power of the state to abolish such a method of business as
inimical to the public welfare. 122 Where the object of the tax is something
which the Court believes should in the public interest be preserved and not
destroyed, a different result, it is believed, will be attained. Proof of this
lies in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,123 in which a unanimous Court held
that a Louisiana license tax of two per cent on the gross receipts of those
engaged in the business of publishing advertising in newspapers was an
infringement on the liberty of the press, and contrary to due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court did not hesitate to see other
than revenue purposes in the law in question. "It is bad because, in the
light of its history, and in its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate
and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of in-
formation to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties."
All tax laws have an economic and social effect. Although the Federal
visions see, Pound, Spurious Interpretation (1907) 7 CoL. L. REv. 379, 384. I am indebted
to Professor Oliver Rundell for calling my attention in this connection to this excerpt.
.oSee Sonzinsky v. United States, 57 Sup. Ct. 554 (1937.
"'244 U. S. 590 (1917).
e'Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
'Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937), quoted
supra p. 63.
'297 U. S. 233 (1936).
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Government has only fiscal powers in this connection, it may still use its.
tax power to achieve much incidental regulation. Within the limits of due
process it may even use the tax power to destroy. By exemptions and special
levies, tax laws of both the nation and the state may either aid or hinder
activities in accordance with reasonable social and economic objectives. It is.
believed that the courts should not and will not permit the power to tax to-
be used to destroy those things which the state cannot destroy by direct
legislation.
